In balancing religious freedom with the right to equality and human dignity of persons affected by discriminatory measures, the provisions of sections 9, 10, 15(1), 31 (1) 
BACKGROUND
Religious freedom (s 15(1)) and freedom of religious communities (s 31 (1) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Freedom of belief or religion in terms of section 15(1) of the Constitution is a manifestation of the constitutional principle that everyone has the right to decide in what way he/she wants to express his/her belief and take part in religious practices. This aspect is connected to the fact that individuals have the right to decide where they want to commit themselves in the free exercise of their religious convictions as protected by section 31(1). It leads to a free society in which every individual can develop and realise him-/herself. 2 Section 9 prohibits any discrimination against a person on the ground of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, belief, conviction, culture or language (section 9(4)), with the exception of cases where such discrimination can be justified (section 9(5)).
Freedom and equality as principles to be taken into account in this regard seem to be contradictory principles. 3 It is, however, necessary that a balancing of interests should take place, which will indicate in every specific case to what extent the equality principle is compatible with the freedom of religion of individuals. 4 In balancing these interests the degree to which an association or institution is of a private or public nature and/or functions accordingly is important, but not decisive.
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In S v Manamela and Another 6 the balancing effect of section 36 was described as an overall assesment that will vary from case to case:
In essence, the Court must engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at a global judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a sequential check-list. As a general rule, the more serious the impact of the measure on the right, the more persuasive or compelling the Rights and constitutionalism, 196; Woolman & De Waal 1994 , 340-341. 4 Davis 1994 : "Equality thus is inextricably linked to the conception of liberty if society is to allow the promotion of competeting interests. Where equality is different, however, to liberty is that it depends upon a comparator. It is here that equality becomes an enigmatic concept." See also S v Manamela and Another 2000 3 SA 1 (CC). justification must be. Ultimately, the question is one of degree to be assessed in the concrete legislative and social setting of the measure, paying due regard to the means which are realistically available in our country at this stage, but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be protected….
Each particular infringement of a right has different implications in an open and democratic society based on dignity, equality and freedom. There can accordingly be no absolute standard for determining reasonableness.
EQUALITY LEGISLATION
The equality principle in terms of section 9 of the Constitution was further strengthened by the promulgation of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. In the preamble it is stated that the consolidation of democracy in South
Africa requires the eradication of social and economic inequalities. Systemic inequalities and unfair discrimination remain deeply embedded in social structures, practices and attitudes. The Act endeavours to facilitate the transition to a democratic society, united in its diversity, marked by human relations that are caring and compassionate, and guided by the principles of equality, fairness, equity, social progress, justice, human dignity and freedom.
Chapter 4 prescribes the procedure of instituting a claim in terms of the Act. An important issue is the determination of the burden of proof and whether the discrimination was fair or unfair. In terms of section 13(1) the complainant may make out a prima facie case of discrimination, whereupon the respondent must prove, on the facts before the court, that the discrimination did not take place as alleged or the conduct is not based on one or more of the prohibited grounds. If the respondent does not succeed in rebutting that the discrimination took place on any of the specific prohibited grounds 7 , such discrimination is unfair, unless the respondent proves that the discrimination is fair (section 13(2)(a)). This procedure differs from the normal procedure set by Harksen v
Lane NO 8 where the applicant has to prove that discrimination on any of the grounds prohibited in section 9 of the Constitution took place, whereupon the presumption of 7
See the grounds listed in (a) of the description of 'prohibited grounds' in s 1 of the Act, which correspond with the grounds of s 9(3) of the Constitution.
unfair discrimination may be rebutted by the respondent. Where the discrimination is based on any other ground that causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage, undermines human dignity or adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person's rights and freedoms in a serious manner, 9 section 13(2)(b) stipulates that such discrimination is unfair, unless the respondent proves that it is fair.
Sections 14 states certain factors that have to be used in the determination of the fairness or unfairness of discriminatory actions or procedure. These factors are an expansion of the factors stated in section 36(1) of the Constitution:
It is not unfair to take measures designed to protect or advance persons previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
(ii) In determining whether discrimination is fair, the context and the question whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to objectively determinable criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned, should be considered.
(iii) Whether the discrimination impairs human dignity.
(iv) The impact of the discrimination on the complainant.
(v)
The position of the complainant in society and whether he/she suffers from patterns of disadvantage.
(vi) The nature and extent of the discrimination.
(vii) Whether the discrimination is systemic in nature.
(viii) Whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose.
(ix) Whether the discrimination achieves its purpose and whether there are less restrictive and diasadvantageous means to achieve the purpose.
(x)
Whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being reasonable in the circumstances to address the disadvantage and accommodate diversity.
EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION IN CASE LAW
8 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) 324H-325D; Kok 2001, 304. 9 See (b) of the description of prohibited grounds in s 1 of the Act. These grounds are not stated in s 9 of the Constitution.
From the above-mentioned discussion it is clear that freedom of religion is not protected and applied in isolation, but all the rights, freedoms and values of the Bill of Rights are applied in a balanced way in the context and according to the circumstances of a specific case. Therefore the right to equality and non-discrimination always forms part of the balancing process.
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education
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An interesting application of the constitutional principles regarding freedom of religion, belief and opinion in terms of section 15 (1) religion, cannot be used to shield practices which offend the Bill of Rights. These explicit qualifications may be seen as serving a double purpose. The first is to prevent protected associational rights of members of communities from being used to 'privatise' constitutionally offensive group practices and thereby immunise them from external legislative regulation or judicial control. This would be particularly important in relation to practices previously associated with the abuse of the notion of pluralism to achieve exclusivity, privilege and domination. The second relates to oppressive features of internal relationships primarily within the communities concerned, where section 8, which regulates the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights, might be specially relevant.
This is clearly an area where interpretation should be prudently undertaken so that appropriate constitutional analysis can be developed over time in the light of the multitude of different situations that will arise.
The last-mentioned caution is extremely important. Cultural (and religious) associations will generally find themselves in a similarly advantageous position. To the extent that these associations stick to bona fide religious and cultural activities they will be relatively immune to state intervention.
While there may be the odd good reason to open up the membership policies of cultural and religious associations, there are no good reason for state interference in the internal affairs of such associations. The internal affairs of such associations are generally linked to some concrete vision of religious or community life. In a liberal society the state should have no role to play in the construction of these particular visions of the good life.
Although the viewpoint of these authors can be approved of in broad outline, the state ought to be able to intervene in the internal relationships or activities of the organisation In applying the proportionality principle to the different aspects of the constitutional value of human dignity, justice Sachs held that the ban on corporal punishment formed part of a legislative scheme designed to establish uniform educational standards. Although such measure may be considered as discriminatory on religious grounds, the ban was part of a comprehensive process of eliminating state-sanctioned use of physical force as a method of punishment: 16 The outlawing of physical punishment in the school accordingly represented more than a pragmatic attempt to deal with disciplinary problems in a new way. It had a principled and symbolic function, manifestly intended to prmote respect for the dignity and physical and emotional integrity of all children.
A.
Prince v President, Cape Law Society
17
The question before the constitutional court was whether the respondent might refuse Human dignity is an important constitutional value that not only informs the interpretation of most, if not all, other constitutional rights, but is also central in the limiatations analysis." 20 Christian Education case 772G-773D: "There are a number of other provisions designed to protect the rights of members of communities. They underline the constitutional value of acknowledging diversity and pluralism in our society and give a particular texture to the broadly phrased right to freedom of association contained in s 18. Taken together, they affirm the right of people to be who they are without being forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of others, right to personal belief and religious practices in terms of section 15(1) and the right to practice these beliefs in a community in terms of section 31(1), are in the first instance subjected to the limitation embodied in section 31 (2) Rastafari to use cannabis in the exercise of religious practices.
22
CONCLUSION
Although the interaction between freedom of religion and the equality principle protects a person from unnecessary state intervention in his/her religious activities, these rights are not absolute or unlimited. In the case of discrimination based on a prohibition on the exercise of religious practices, the burden rests on the respondent to proof that a distinction is based on acknowledged church dogma or religious beliefs, and is of such a nature that it passes the test of a nuanced and context-sensitive form of balancing of these rights and the right to equality of affected persons. It was even proposed that a and highlight the importance of individuals and communities being able to enjoy what has been called the 'right to be different'. In each case, space has been found for members of communities to depart from a legal norm. These provisions collectively and separately acknowledge the rich tapestry constituted by civil society, indicating in particular that language, culture and religion constitute a strong weave in the overall pattern. It might well be that in the envisaged pluralistic society members of large groups can more easily rely on the legislative process than can those belonging to smaller ones, so that the latter might be specially reliant on constitutional protection, particularly if they express their beliefs in a way that the majority regard as unusual, bizarre or even threatening. Nevertheless, the interest protected by s 31 is not a statical one dependent on a counter-balancing of numbers, but a qualitative one based on respect for diversity." 21 Christian Education case par 30; Prince case par 128. 22 Par 139. strict scrutiny test has to be applied in the case of racial and gender discrimination.
Although a person's right to religious freedom is one of the key ingredients of his/her human dignity (cf the Christian Education case), it is not absolute and may in certain circumstances be exceeded by the interest of the community or international obligations (cf the Prince case).
